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I left for Bombay on March 6th for a three-week trip to India to watch
what proved to be an historic election. Mrs. Gandhi's defeat ended twenty-
one months of emergency rule under which the government had summarily arrested
thousands of opponents, suspended habeas corpus, imposed censorship on the
press, and banned strikes and public meetings. Before the elections were
declared many observers had concluded that India's long-standing democratic
government was being replaced by a personal hereditary Asian dictatorship
under Mrs. Gandhi and her son, Sanjay.
It came as a surprise when on January 18th Mrs. Gandhi announced in a
radio broadcast that elections to parliament would be held in mid-March. At
the same time she released thousands from jail, including her most prominent
opponents (some of whom were members of the governing Congress party). She
suspended press censorship and announced that public meetings would be permitted.
But she also made it clear that the emergency was not ended, nor were civil
liberties permanently restored. As she said in her broadcast, for the duration
of the election campaign the "rules" of the emergency would be "relaxed".
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It was widely understood that Mrs. Gandhi was holding the elections for
two reasons. She was seeking a mandate for the emergency and for her recent
amendments to the constitution and a number of parliamentary acts which made
authoritarian government a more permanent feature of Indian life. Her critics,
domestic and foreign, would she thought be silenced by a massive electoral
victory. It would legitimize these changes domestically and strengthen Mrs.
Gandhi's reputation internationally.
Many observers noted that Mrs. Gandhi continued to be concerned with
western criticism. Though she denounced western critics for failing to under-
stand that the emergency was necessary under Indian conditions to provide the
country with stability and discipline, her frequent interviews with western
reporters to explain her position showed how sensitive she was to what they
wrote. In her announcement she pointedly said that elections would "uphold
the fair name of India."
Elections would also provide her son, Sanjay, with an opportunity to
establish his power within the Congress parliamentary party and thereby ensure
his succession to the Prime Ministership. Sanjay had risen to prominence
during the emergency as the leader of the Youth Congress, an affiliate of the
country's governing Congress party. Though he held no public office, he was
generally regarded as a powerful influence within the government. Some
supporters of Mrs. Gandhi saw the Youth Congress as a potential mass movement
that would provide support for the government. But Sanjay's critics feared
that the movement, which attracted many tough opportunistic youth and which
was developing strong ties with the local police, might become India's equiva-
lent of a fascist youth corp.
-3-
Under the emergency India's long-standing democratic government was
beginning to look more and more like that of other third-world regimes. Power
was concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister and a close coterie of
supporters associated with Sanjay, while parliament had become a rubber stamp.
The paramilitary Border Security Forces had grown in importance, as had the
Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), an intelligence gathering unit located in
the Prime Minister's secretariat. Armed with a law called the Maintenance of
Internal Security Act (MISA) the government could arrest opponents at will
without reasons.- The government had passed the Press Objectionable Matter
Act so that press regulation would continue even if the emergency were ended.
The constitution was amended to permit the government to prohibit "anti-
national" activities. The powers of the judiciary were curtailed while those
of the Prime Minister were increased.
An underground opposition to the government had developed, but it hardly
constituted a threat. Only a few months earlier, George Fernandez, the most
prominent leader of the underground, was picked up by the police. Strikes
were effectively clamped down and while there was some vocal protest in New
Delhi and in other parts of north India over the slum clearance and steriliza-
tion programs there were no signs of any mass movement against the government.
When the announcement was made it seemed like a foregone conclusion that
Mrs. Gandhi and the Congress party would win. As a result of three reasonably
good monsoons the food situation was satisfactory. Prices, though rising, were
increasing at a substantially lower rate than before the emergency. The govern-
ment claimed some successes in its twenty point program to improve the lot of
the urban and rural poo' by allocating housing sites to Harijans, redistributing
land to the landless, abolishing bonded labor, ending or at least reducing
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rural indebtedness, and providing alternate housing for urban squatters. While
each of these "benefits" of the emergency had its detractors the government
viewed these measures as both successful and popular.
Sanjay appeared to be emerging as a popular leader. His own "Five Point
Program" for social progress, which included family planning, seemed to have
taken root. Large crowds appeared at his public meetings, press coverage of
his speeches was enthusiastic, he was acclaimed by the chief ministers and
other Congress leaders of states he visited, and his Youth Congress was
apparently attracting hundreds of thousands of followers. Sanjay's promise,
and Mrs. Gandhi's hope, that the Youth Congress would emerge as a powerful
force within the Congress party, built upon a popular base of energetic young
people, seemed within grasp.
On such short notice it seemed unlikely that the opposition could by
mid-March organize itself into a single party with a common platform. And
given the likelihood that they would lose how would they raise money? In a
country with 320 million voters and 542 parliamentary constituencies it had to
be an expensive election campaign. Even though censorship had been suspended,
the press would surely be cautious. The government had not relinquished the
control it had established over the governing boards of several papers, and
it had, moreover, established its own consolidated news agency.
But within two weeks of Mrs. Gandhi's announcement, it became clear that
this was likely to be a genuine election. On January 21 the opposition leaders,
most of whom had just been released from jail, met in New Delhi to announce
the formation of the Janata party, a unified opposition party with a single
program. Previously, the opposition parties had been divided. Since the
Congress party had won earlier elections with less than a majority of popular
votes many thought that a unified opposition could now make very substantial
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inroads into the Congress parliamentary strength. Given the long history of
aborted efforts to unify the opposition, the creation of the Janata party
came as a considerable surprise. The Janata party was made up of four groups:
the Socialists, the Jana Sangh (a pro-Hindu right of center party), the
Bharatiya Lok Dal (B.L.D.), (a regional party in northern India), and a
group known as the Congress Organization, which had separated from Mrs. Gandhi's
Congress when the party split in 1969. The four parties had worked together
before, but now for the first time they appeared to be submerging their
individual identities. Many of the opposition leaders felt that unless they
created a unified party, Mrs. Gandhi was sure to be reelected and were that
to happen, there might never again be an opportunity for a free election.
Another incentive for unification was a statement by Jayaprakash Narayan. The
elderly much revered Gandhian Socialist who had led the pre-emergency campaign
against the Prime Minister, said that he would not take part in the election
campaign unless the opposition created a unified party.
The biggest surprise, however, came on February 2 when a senior minister
in Mrs. Gandhi's cabinet, Jagjivan Ram, resigned from the government, denounced
the emergency, and announced that he was forming his own political party, the
Congress for Democracy, which would support Janata party candidates. Ram, a
long-time Congress leader and minister, was a prominent figure in the politics
of the state of Bihar and a leader of India's Harijan community. He was
particularly harsh in denouncing Mrs. Gandhi for having destroyed democracy
within the Congress party. Ram noted that during the emergency party offices
were appointed, not elected, and the chief ministers of India's states were
chosen by the Prime Minister rather than elected by the state legislative
assemblies dominated by the Congress party. Two prominent state leaders, both
former chief ministers of their states followed suit. Mr. H.N. Bahaguna, a
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54 year old trade unionist and Congress leader in Uttar Pradesh, India's
largest state, and Mrs. Nandini Satpathi, an attractive 46 year old social
worker and political leader from the eastern state of Orissa also announced
that they were resigning from Congress to join Jagjivan Ram.
Ram's resignation evidently led Mrs. Gandhi to be fearful of more wide-
spread defections from the Congress party. It was initially assumed that
Sanjay Gandhi and his Youth Congress followers would be given a large number
of tickets in the parliamentary elections, perhaps as many as 150-200 out of
the 542 parliamentary seats. But of course this would have meant denying
renomination to a very large number of the sitting Congress members in parliament.
With Ram's resignation, Mrs. Gandhi concluded that most of the sitting members
had best be renominated. To discourage some of the state Congress leaders
from joining Ram, several were given considerable influence in the allocation
of tickets to their own supporters.
Jagjivan Ram's resignation thus deprived Mrs. Gandhi of the opportunity
to restructure the distribution of power in favor of her son within the Congress
parliamentary party. It also tended to strengthen the position of some of the
state Congress leaders who were thought to be less than loyal to Mrs. Gandhi.
And it provided an important psychological boost to the Janata party.
The first indication that Mrs. Gandhi might be in trouble occurred at the
public rallies organized by the Janata party in India's major cities. The
largest of these was a public rally at Ram Lila grounds in New Delhi where an
estimated half million people came to hear Jagjivan Ram, Jayaprakash Narayan,
and Morarji Desai, the leader of the Janata party. Mrs. Gandhi's rallies were
not so well attended and she was often booed by members of the audience.
Still, it was generally assumed in early March that Mrs. Gandhi's
Congress party would win, though perhaps by a substantially reduced majority.
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Commerce, a leading business review published in Bombay, reported in its
special number reviewing the state of the economy during 1976, that the country
had built an impressive buffer stock of food, industrial production had
substantially increased, performance of the government-run public sector plants
had showed a significant improvement, a successful program of oil exploration
had led to the commercial production of crude oil from wells off the coast of
Bombay, foreign trade had substantially increased leading to a favorable trade
balance in 1976, there had been a very substantial increase in the country's
foreign exchange reserves, and wholesale prices had increased modestly by
8.5% during the year. Commerce estimated that real national income had
increased by 6.5% in 1975 and by an additional 3% in 1976. The slowdown from
'75 to '76 was primarily due to the lack of growth in agriculture during the
past year as compared to the unusually high rate of growth in 1975 when the
monsoon was substantially superior as compared to last year.
Surely, even if she lost some of the urban areas, it was said, Mrs.
Gandhi would win the support of the countryside. Given the improved economic
situation, it seemed unlikely that the countryside would turn against the
government because it had imposed censorship on the press, arrested political
opponents of the government, banned strikes, or weakened the independence of
the judiciary -- issues that could, so it was said, hardly affect the masses
of rural people. Not only in the West, but within the Indian government
itself, it was generally held that in a developing society a largely illiterate
peasantry is more likely to be moved by economic considerations than by abstract
arguments about democracy and civil liberties. Sanjay Gandhi had made this
point only a few months earlier when he called for postponing the elections
because, as he put it, the country wanted "bread not elections."
I questioned this argument. Research I had conducted on Indian elections
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from 1952-1971 showed that there were very few differences in the way rural
and urban India voted. Differences were noted in the early elections, but by
the mid-1960's these had more or less disappeared. In most of the states the
turnout in urban areas had been no higher than in the surrounding countryside.
In most states, the townspeople and the city people generally voted for the
same political parties as the rural dwellers. It looked as if both the cities
and villages were swayed by some of the same influences.
In India there is a great deal of movement of rural migrants back and
forth from the towns to the countryside. Both villagers and city people
listen to the same transistor radios. The newspapers, especially those
published in the regional languages, have become ubiquitous. Most importantly,
political parties had reached down to the small towns and large villages.
There were elections not only to parliament, and to the state assemblies, but
to village and district councils. Villagers, perhaps even more than city
people, were in frequent touch with the local bureaucracy and with elected
local officials. Political awareness seemed as high in the countryside as in
the cities, in spite of differences in education and income.
But this was a unique election. The Janata party and the Congress for
Democracy were running on a single issue. "The choice before the electorate
is clear," said the Janata party manifesto. "It is a choice between freedom
and slavery; between democracy and dictatorship; between abdicating the power
of the people or asserting it; between the Gandhian path and the way that has
led many nations down the precipice of dictatorship, instability, military
adventure and national ruin." Lofty phrases, but would these mean as much in
rural India, or in the city slums, as they might among the educated classes
in the cities?
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Bombay, March 8
During the ride from Santa Cruz International Airport into the center
of Bombay I could already see the signs of an election campaign. Every wall,
large and small, seemed to be covered by an election poster or by graffiti.
The Congress theme was simply "For progress and stability -- vote Congress."
Congress posters paired photos of Mrs. Gandhi with that of the local Congress
candidate, though often there were only photos of Mrs. Gandhi. A favorite
graffiti was, "Support Indira Gandhi -- Vote cow and calf (symbols of the
Congress party)". Many posters from the emergency with hortatory slogans
persisted: "Talk less, work more", "There is no substitute for hard work",
and "Twenty point program is a blueprint for progress".
Janata had fewer posters but more graffiti. "Our pledge -- bread and
liberty -- vote Janata" was a favorite Janata slogan. Among the other slogans
I saw were "Save democracy -- vote for Janata party", "Problems are plenty,
points are twenty, results are empty", "We were curtailed -- freedom of speech,
freedom of press, fundamental rights, freedom of association -- to restore them
forever vote for Janata party", "Our leaders and political leaders are still
in jail -- release them at once -- vote for Janata", "Vote for Janata --
farmer cum plow (the symbols of the Janata party)", "A ballot for Janata is
a bullet for democracy", "For civil liberties, freedom of the press, indepen-
dence of judiciary, vote for Janata party", and "What do you want? Freedom
or slavery? For freedom elect Janata party."
The government's Election Commission had a single poster which said
"Vote without fear -- your vote is secret".
Banners and streamers were tied across streets, especially on the main
thoroughfares in slum areas. Every few blocks I saw a neighborhood office of
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one of the political parties. Each was typically located in a single room of
a wooden storefront, in a busy bazaar. In the early evening hours there were
processions of young people shouting slogans. Later in the evening after the
sun went down, and the temperature dropped there were large public rallies
which often continued into the late hours of the night and even into the
early morning.
On my first day in Bombay I visited several political party offices. A
neighborhood Janata party office that I visited was typical. It was a small
room that measured about 10 x 15 feet. The room contained one large wood
desk, four chairs, a metal cabinet, a wood bookcase with cards, leaflets, two
straw mats, a telephone, and a large brass jug for water. On the wall was a
ward map, a calendar and a photo of the Janata party candidate. An overhead
fan and a single fluorescent light hung from the ceiling. But the air and
light came largely from the open door facing the main bazaar street. A
bullhorn with a battery was on the windowsill. In the corner were several
Janata party flags. One was attached to a pole. There were also several
10-foot bamboo sticks in the corner. Presumably they too were for flags.
Everyone in the room was barefooted. Each person's sandals had been dropped
in a pile on the concrete floor by the door.
People were moving in and out in a disorganized fashion. They sometimes
stopped to talk to one another and occasionally picked up a pile of cards from
the desk with the names, addresses and polling station of each voter on the
voting list. At one point there were nineteen people in the little room.
The man behind the desk, evidently the office manager, was about thirty
years old. He explained to me that the parliamentary constituency was broken
into four state assembly constituencies, which were divided in turn into four
municipal wards. His particular office was in charge of one of the wards. It
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was responsible for arranging local street corner meetings, and mounting
posters, but most important was the responsibility for directing the voters
to the polls.
I asked him what issues were emphasized as workers canvassed the consti-
tuency. "Since this is largely a working class constituency," he answered,
"here we talk about the compulsory deposit scheme and the bonus issue." He
explained that under the compulsory deposit scheme, most of the dearness
allowances that workers had received had been taken by the government and put
into forced savings. Moreover, during the emergency employers were no longer
required to give annual bonuses to the workers. Most workers generally
regarded the bonuses in India as a deferred wage but the government had
declared that unless businesses had earned a specified profit bonuses were not
mandatory. The unions opposed the government on the compulsory deposit scheme
and the bonus issue. They were unable, however, to do anything about it,
since public demonstrations and strikes were forbidden during the emergency.
Janata workers also talked about the family planning issue. The state
government of Maharashtra passed a law last year requiring that everyone with
more than three children, who worked for the government, had to be sterilized.
The President of India had not signed the bill. It was therefore not yet a
law. "But," he said, "if this government is reelected the law will be enacted."
"Nasbandi" -- the Hindi word for vasectomy -- if not a major issue in
Bombay, certainly raised furors throughout most of northern India. Inder
Malhotra, an editor of the Times of India, Bombay's leading daily, had just
returned from a tour of rural constituencies in north India. He reported
that Sanjay Gandhi had successfully persuaded many chief ministers to set up
travelling vasectomy camps that would move from village to village to ensure
that large numbers of people were vasectomized. Quotas had been imposed on
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state and local government officials. "There is hardly a school teacher, a
civil servant, railway man, or police inspector in this sprawling state,"
wrote Inder Malhotra in an article on the state of Uttar Pradesh, "whose pay,
promotion, or confirmation was not held up pending the production by him or
her of certificates to show that he or she had motivated a requisite number
of persons to undergo sterilization." The result, he said, is that officials
often coerced local people to undergo sterilization. In the town of Muzaffarnagar,
there were armed battles between the local people and the police. Quite a few
people were killed in police firings. Many, he said, thought that vasectomy
meant the same as castration. There were stories of young men being forced
into the vasectomy camps. There were incidents of post-operative infections
as doctors moved quickly from village to village. Popular hostility to the
compulsory sterilization program was so great that one life-long committed
Congressman told Malhotra, "These damned vasectomies have become something like
the greased cartridges of 1857". He was referring to the time when rumors that
the cartridges of bullets were greased with pork lard led Muslim soldiers in
the British army to mutiny.
Malhotra expected the Congress party to do badly in the states of U.P.,
Punjab, Bihar, Haryana, and Himachal. It was in those states that Bansi Lal,
the Defense Minister, and Sanjay Gandhi had been influential in pressing for
the sterilization program. The Muslims and the Harijans and other low income
communities were hit the worst by the government quotas. He anticipated that
those groups would turn against the government, and he thought that local
officials in those states would also turn against the government. Not because
they didn't like the idea of quotas, but because the government was now blaming
them for some of the "excesses" of the emergency. "The officials," he said,
"resent being used as a scapegoat for the government's excesses."
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On March 5th a statement was issued by the All India State Government
Employees Federation rebuking the government's attempt to blame its employees
for the excesses in the family planning program. The statement said that the
state governments had established quotas for motivating sterilization cases.
"When employees could not achieve the quota, it resulted in withholding
their increments, recovery of double the house rent due, non-drawal of salaries,
and even discharge from service. For example, in Bihar alone, over 600
employees lost their jobs and 50,000 were not given their salaries for three
months ... The terror-stricken employees were literally driven to fall on the
hapless people." Moreover the chief ministers and health ministers of the
states had drawn up targets for sterilization and even "coerced government
employees to undergo sterilization. It was preposterous for those in power
to assume an air of "injured innocence and pretend ignorance of all that
was going on under their very nose .... Those who drive a wedge between the
employees and the people do not serve the real interests of the nation. They
serve only themselves."
The newspapers report that Bansi Lal, Sanjay Gandhi's strongest supporter
in the Congress party and in the government, is in difficulty in his consti-
tuency in the northern state of Haryana. Bansi Lal's constituency, Dhiwani,
has generally been considered a Congress stronghold, and has been nursed so
well by Bansi Lal over the years that some even thought that the seat might
even not be contested by the opposition. Bansi Lal was widely regarded as an
able chief minister who played a significant role- in accelerating economic
development in the state, and he had been particularly conscientious about
nursing his constituency. But reporters touring the constituency have been
describing angry sentiments against Bansi Lal and against the Congress party
government. "Residents of village after village refer to acts of highhanded-
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ness, not all of them connected with family planning," wrote the correspondent
for the Times of India. The reporter noted that many influential village
leaders who had been elected to local bodies or cooperative societies had
been replaced by their rivals, who had lost the elections, and who had been
installed through governmental nomination. The reporter noted that there was
universal opposition to the nomination of leaders of local bodies. "If the
fate of a sarpanch (local government representative) is to be decided by
someone in Chandigarh or New Delhi," said a former village schoolteacher,
"we must then have our own man to wield power in Chandigarh or New Delhi."
This, the reporter went on to say, explains the keen interest of villagers in
the forthcoming parliamentary poll. One of the parliamentary candidates is
reported to have said, "Villagers are taking as much interest in the Lok Sabha
(parliamentary) elections this time as they generally do in elections to the
village panchayats."
According to the newspapers, the family planning program is also a source
of enormous bitterness. "Among the victims are a forty-five year old Muslim
and his younger brother who was forced to undergo sterilization last November.
The circumstances in which the incidents took place make it even more tragic.
Their mother had just died and they had gone to the town to purchase a piece
of white cloth to cover the coffin. A couple of policemen dragged them into
a jeep and took them to the health center where they were forcibly sterilized
despite protests and tearful pleas." The reporter went on to describe another
incident.
"A sixty-five year old Harijan widow sat next to this reporter in a
Gohana-bound bus. She was going to meet her daughter married to a municipal
sweeper. When asked if she knew the elections to the Lok Sabha were around
the corner, she said: "Babuji, you will see what this lady gets this time!
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She had rendered my four sons and three sons-in-law impotent."
"Her neighbor, a Jat, had hid her sons in his sugar cane fields for
some time. "It was their bad luck," she sighed, "that they were caught after
a few days and were sterilized."
March 10
The most important "prestige" constituency in the city is Bombay North
Central. There Ram Jetmalani, a former president of the India Bar Association,
challenged the seat of Mr. Gokhale, the government's law minister. During
the emergency, when a warrant was issued for his arrest, Mr. Jetmalani fled
India and was granted asylum in the United States. When his plane landed at
Santa Cruz Airport -- "I landed in my constituency" -- the warrant was still
pending. Mr. Gokhale, however, advised the government not to arrest Mr.
Jetmalani, and allow him to remain free to contest the election.
From six in the evening until three in the morning and six public
meetings later, I accompanied Jetmalani. His son Tony, who had returned from
his studies in Oxford to work for his father, was with him, as well as his
attractive wife who sat next to him on the platform at each of the public
meetings. There were never less than several thousand people at a meeting.
At one, which began at two in the morning, there were upwards of fifty thousand
persons. The larger the crowds the longer Jetmalani talked and the more enthu-
siastic both he and his audience were. As he entered and left there were
shouts of "victory to the Janata party and victory to Jetmalani!" At three
smaller neighborhood meetings, local community leaders presented him with
garlands of flowers. Several of the garlands contained rupee notes to help him
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in his election campaign.
Since Jetmalani comes originally from the Sind (now in Pakistan) and
is unable to speak the local language, Marathi, he generally spoke in Hindi,
which most of the Marathi audience could follow. To a predominantly Christian
crowd in one neighborhood he spoke first in English and then in Hindi.
In each of his speeches he spoke about the issue of freedom and demo-
cracy. He denounced Sanjay's statement that the country needed bread not
elections. He decried the view that only the educated were concerned about
freedom. Tens of thousands of people, he said, had come to hear Jayaprakash
Narayan and Morarji speak not about economic issues but democracy, liberty,
and arrest without trial. Without freedom, he said, the government is able
to enforce a compulsory family planning program against the poor. Without
freedom the government was bulldozing the homes of slum dwellers. Without
freedom workers could not strike for their just demands. Without freedom
the Muslim and Christian minorities could not be protected. Only under the
rule of law, he said, could they all be free. He charged Gokhale, his opponent
and law minister, with responsibility for the constitutional amendments that
had weakened the power of the courts. Then, speaking at a meeting of lawyers
in central Bombay, Jetmalani alluded to the attacks against Mrs. Gandhi by
her aunt, Vijayalakshmi Pandit. He told the lawyers that "As Mrs. Gandhi is
a discard of her family, so Mr. Gokhale must be a discard of the lawyers."
Some of the speeches of the opposition candidates and leaders sounded
like political science lectures. M.C. Chagla, a distinguished elderly judge
who had at one time been ambassador to the United States, spoke on the public
platform with Jetmalani at the meeting of Bombay lawyers. He said that the
choice was between democracy and dictatorship and that the rule of law was
essential if there was to be liberty. He denounced Mrs. Gandhi for her claims
-17-
that she, like Louis XIV, had to remain in power if there was to be a stable
government. "Indira is not India and India is not Indira," he said, reversing
a much publicized statement made by Mr. Barooah, the President of the Congress
party. In a democracy, he said, no one is indispensable. He spoke of the
lawyers as the vanguard of the freedom struggle. "Gandhi, Motilal, Jawaharlal
and Vallabahi Patel were all lawyers who understood the importance of law in a
free society. It is too bad that Mrs. Gandhi is not a lawyer too for perhaps
if she were she might have respect for the law." He pointed out that Mrs.
Gandhi claimed that she was continuing the emergency in order to assure
"stability and progress" for the country, but that the only ground provided by
the constitution for maintaining an emergency was to deal with an internal or
external threat to the country's security. As to whether the Janata party
had a program for the country, "What greater program can a party have than the
restoration of democracy!" he said.
In addition to the lawyers who canvassed on Jetmalani's behalf and helped
fund his campaign, Jetmalani had the support of one of the state's popular
Marathi writers, Deshpande. At one of the large public rallies on Jetmalani's
behalf, Deshpande told an enthusiastic audience that he had come to speak to
them for only one reason -- to say that they must remove Gokhale as the man
responsible for writing the amendments to the constitution that had deprived
them of their freedom. Then he told the laughing audience that he had recently
walked into a Bombay bookstore to ask for a copy of the Indian constitution
that had been amended so often by the government, and was told by the shop-
keeper that he didn't keep periodicals!
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March 11
The morning newspaper reported that at a press conference in Cochin
Mrs. Gandhi was asked whether it was true the government was cutting off all
advertising to newspapers that were opposed to the Congress party. "Why
should we give advertisements and support newspapers owned by big industrialists
who have enormous money at their disposal?" was her response.
In an editorial, "Ads as patronage", the Indian Exress replied that
Mrs. Gandhi's attitude "is contrary to government spokesmen's repeated
declarations in the past regarding the basis on which government advertisements
are given to newspapers ... If the main consideration in selecting the media
for government or public sector advertisements is not their value or utility as
media, but the political or other attitudes of the owners ... this will mean a
blatant abuse of public funds for partisan ends." With such a policy there
would be "special dangers to a free press in an increasingly state-controlled
and state-owned economy like ours," the editorial concluded.
The Indian Express and the Statesman are two of India's largest circu-
lating English dailies. Both resisted government domination during the
emergency and both were in the forefront of the attacks against the government.
After Mrs. Gandhi announced that she was "relaxing" the emergency, and had
ended press censorship, both newspapers boldly reported accounts of governmental
excesses during the emergency, and both reported the growing wave of sentiment
against Congress candidates. I was told that the circulation of the Delhi
edition of the Indian Express leaped three-fold during the election campaign.
It was they that were the targets of Mrs. Gandhi's decision to curtail
government advertising to newspapers opposed to the Congress party.
Two of the other major English dailies, The Hindu which is published from
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Madras and the Hindustan Times, published from New Delhi, continued to support
the government. The Times of India, the largest of the newspapers, was at
first cautious but by mid-campaign began to pay increasing attention to the
activities of the Janata party.
In previous elections Bombay city was a Congress stronghold. The Bombay
city Congress organization was regarded as one of the most effective party
"machines", one which played a particularly important role in fund raising
for the national party. In the 1960's the Bombay party organization was
dominated by S.K. Patil. In the 1969 split he was forced out of the party
by Mrs. Gandhi. Since then the city machine was run by Rajni Patel. Patel
proved to be important not only in the city but as a major figure in the national
party organization. As part of her efforts, however, to prevent independent
centers of power emerging within the party organization, Mrs. Gandhi took steps
to abolish the independent Bombay Congress committee. She incorporated the
city organization into the state party, thereby deflating Rajni Patel's power.
Just a few months before the election Sanjay Gandhi at a public meeting in
Bombay berated Patel for independently raising money for the party. It was
a clear signal to the business community that funds should be contributed
directly to the central Congress party organization in New Delhi.
A bill permitting corporations rather than just individuals to contribute
directly to political parties was introduced into Parliament by the Congress
leadership but subsequently dropped. Some businessmen privately complained
that they were being extorted by the government to make very large contribu-
tions to the Congress party by purchasing, at 10 to 20,000 rupees per page,
advertisements in so-called "souvenir volumes" published by the party.
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Gasoline sells for $2.00 a gallon in India. Nevertheless, Congress party
candidates appeared to be well supplied with jeeps and automobiles. They had
more posters, banners, pamphlets and leaflets than the opposition and could
fund larger numbers of local party offices throughout the city. Nonetheless
it was widely reported that the abolition of the independent Bombay Congress
city organization and the removal of Rajni Patel had thrown the local Congress
organization into disarray.
Though the pro-Soviet Communist party was officially supporting the
Congress party, its trade unions were definitely critical of the emergency and
of the Congress government policy of suspending bonuses. The Muslim league
was officially supporting the Congress party, but it was widely understood
that many of the Muslims in Bombay were quite concerned over the government's
compulsory vasectomy program. By and large, the city's middle class was known
to be hostile to the emergency and to the Congress party. All in all even
Congress supporters thought they would be lucky if they could win three or four
out of the six Bombay seats, all of which were presently held by the Congress.
Congress supporters expected the party to do better in the rural areas
of Maharashtra, where they controlled the elected district councils known as
zilla parishads and almost all of the state's rural cooperatives that were
important sources of credit for farmers, especially those engaged in the
production of sugar cane. Moreover, the Maratha caste which dominated the
countryside continued to support the Congress party.
The editor of one of the leading regional language newspapers told me
that his reporters expected the Congress party to win most of the rural seats
in the state. In contrast to its strength in northern India, he said, the
Janata party had no social base in rural Maharashtra. The vasectomy campaign,
he said, was not as oppressive in Maharashtra as in the northern states of U.P.,
Bihar and Haryana. He thought that the Chamars, one of the Harijan castes,
might support the Janata party because of their ties to Jagjivan Ram, but
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the Mahars, the other leading Harijan caste, would probably remain with the
Congress party. He thought that the rural migrants who had moved into the
cities would probably vote for the Janata party because they were concerned
with the reports they had heard of government slum removal programs in New Delhi.
His reporters touring the state concluded that there would be a substantial
decline in the Congress vote, but that the Congress would still take some
forty out of the forty-eight seats in the state, with the Janata party winning
most of the urban constituencies and gaining substantial support among the
Muslims and the Harijans. "It's possible though that Janata might do better,"
he said, "since there have been such large turnouts at Janata meetings. We
thought that the opposition might not get party workers or money but that has
not been the case."
The newspapers reported today that Sanjay Gandhi, when speaking to a
crowd of about 8,000 people in a constituency in Madhya Pradesh in central
India, described all those who supported the Janata party as "traitors". When
he asked how many such traitors were in the crowd, only three hands were raised.
But he persisted in attacking the Janata "traitors". Again he asked the
"traitors" in the crowd to identify themselves. At that point almost the
entire crowd raised its hands and kept them raised until Sanjay left in a huff.
Hyderabad, March 12
The secretary of the Janata party in Andhra, south India's largest state,
is Mr. A. Chakradhar, a one-time member of the upper house of the Indian
Parliament and a leader of the Socialist party in the state. Chakradhar, a
handsome, tall, lean man with distinguished wavy gray hair, said that he spent
fourteen months of the emergency in the Secunderabad jail near Hyderabad.
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"There were about 500 party workers in the jail," he said. "About 100 belonged
to the R.S.S., the Jamaat-I-Islam, or were Naxalites. The remainder were
Socialists, members of the Jana Sangh, or former Congressmen. The jail
conditions were not too bad and the jailers had no objection if we had meetings.
So in the jail we had classes on ideology, economy, politics, and how the
various groups might come together. The most important change was the way the
other parties came to accept the Jana Sangh workers. The Janata party was
born in jail. We emerged from jail not as a coalition of parties but as a
single party." This was a theme I was to hear from a number of Janata party
workers elsewhere as well.
The opposition parties first attempted to build a single front against
the Congress party during the 1967 state elections. The result was an electoral
arrangement without a common platform. Another attempt was made for the 1971
parliamentary elections. But the first effort to build a single party with a
common platform occurred in Bihar during the anti-government political movement
that was led by Jayaprakash Narayan in 1975. During the June 1975 elections
in Gujarat that were held only a few weeks before Mrs. Gandhi declared an
emergency, the Janata party fought as a single party, with a single platform,
in state-wide elections. In a matter of weeks, before the state-wide arrange-
ment could be turned into a national party, the emergency was declared.
Discussions among the opposition continued in jail. Janata workers I met
spoke almost with nostalgia about the comraderie that existed there. The mood
was reminiscent of the experiences of nationalists who were jailed by the
British during the independence struggle. Jana Sangh workers said that they
and the Socialists came to recognize that they shared an antipathy to "state"
socialism, but supported "Gandhian socialism". The Jana Sangh, with its strong
Hindu nationalist orientation, had always been in favor of a strong central
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government, but the emergency and the growth of central authority under Mrs.
Gandhi had led many Jana Sangh workers to become increasingly sympathetic to
the call by the Socialists for greater decentralization. Jana Sangh workers
also persuaded their fellow detenus that they were not anti-Muslim. As one
Jana Sangh politician explained, "Let Muslim workers make demands as workers
and Muslim slum dwellers make demands as slum dwellers. What we oppose is the
demand for exclusive rights for Muslims alone." Party representatives denied
that the Jana Sangh favored the assimilation of Muslims into Indian society,
and asserted that they recognized the rights of Muslims to remain a separate
religion and culture. They denied that the Jana Sangh, or its closely associated
youth movement the R.S.S., was responsible for the Hindu-Muslim riots that had
occurred in various parts of the country since independence. In the areas of
India, they said, where Jana Sangh was strongest, there have not been riots.
The Jana Sangh, they pointed out, had nominated Muslims for state assembly and
parliamentary constituencies.
March 13
Hazrat Abdullah Shah Bukhari, the Iman of Jamma Masjid, India's largest
mosque, flew down from Delhi to speak to a mass rally of Muslims in the old
quarters of Hyderabad where most of the city's large Muslim population lives.
This imposing bearded figure, dressed in the traditional long robes of a Iman,
had incurred the wrath of the government by his opposition to the program of
the Delhi municipal corporation to clear the Muslim huts that had encroached
on the public spaces around the Jamma Masjid. Sanjay Gandhi had persuaded the
Delhi municipal authorities to beautify the city by clearing shops and huts
that had encroached on public spaces. The first structures to be leveled were
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the houses around the mosque. Subsequently many of the squatter settlements
were disbanded and their inhabitants transported to locations 10-15 miles
from the city. Although eventually many of the squatters were provided with
new housing, there was widespread anger at the manner in which the government
had summarily bulldozed the slum dwellers, and there was considerable unhappi-
ness among them at having been transported to an area far from where most of
them worked. Most of Delhi's slum dwellers were probably Hindus, but the
first to be removed were the Muslims who surrounded the old mosque.
Sanjay Gandhi was not just intent upon beautifying Delhi, he was equally
determined to make the family planning program a success. Why he pressed so
hard on the sterilization issue is still puzzling. Perhaps the answer is the
one given by Kushwant Singh, the editor of the mass circulating popular
Illustrated Weekly, a Bombay magazine. Singh praised Sanjay as a young man who
knew how to get things done! While other politicians spoke of improving the
appearance of cities or of doing something about the population problem,
Sanjay appeared to be capable of getting done what others merely talked about.
Bansi Lal, the Defense Minister, close friend and associate of Sanjay, and one-
time chief minister of the small state of Haryana near Delhi, was also
regarded as a man who could get things done. Under the insistence of Sanjay
and Bansi Lal the health and family planning ministries of several of the
state governments sent teams of medical workers on tour to set up vasectomy
camps.
Given the generally poor quality of the administration in several of the
north Indian states, and the speed with which these vasectomy camps moved from
village to village, it is not surprising that some of the vasectomies were
performed under unsanitary conditions. Stories of forcible sterilization of
the young, the death of some people who were operated upon, and accounts of
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villagers fleeing into fields at night to escape the surgical knife of the
medical staff, rapidly spread through the countryside during the emergency.
Since government workers attempting to fulfill their quotas were reluctant to
coerce the rich and the educated, it was generally the lowest classes who
were pulled into the vasectomy camps.
Some of the most intense opposition to the vasectomy campaign came from
the Muslims. Among the least educated communities in India and one of the
poorest, Muslims have by and large continued to have large families. Pressed
by local officials to undergo sterilizations, Muslims sometimes resisted by
force. A particularly nasty incident between the police and the Muslims at
Turkman Gate in old Delhi led to a police firing in which a number of Muslims
were killed. Word of the Turkman Gate incident, which came to symbolize the
government's forced sterilization program, spread to Muslim communities
throughout northern India.
The Iman of Jamma Masjid had emerged during the election campaign as one
of the most outspoken Muslim opponents of the government. In Hyderabad he
spoke at a crowded press conference at the Sarovar Hotel before going off to
address a large crowd at a public meeting. The Iman, speaking in a booming
voice more appropriate for a public speech than a meeting with journalists at
a press conference, accused Mrs. Gandhi's government of turning Muslims against
the R.S.S. and the Jana Sangh. He said that the attacks against these Hindu
groups were part of the government's effort to follow a British-like policy of
divide and rule. The Iman surprised his audiences by saying that he did not
believe that the R.S.S. or the Jana Sangh were anti-Muslim, and he called upon
the government to end their ban on the R.S.S., whose political workers still
remained in jail. It is not the R.S.S. or the Jana Sangh, he said, that had
fired on Muslims at Turkman Gate, but the government. It was not the R.S.S.
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and Jana Sangh that introduced coercion into family planning, but the govern-
ment. It was not the R.S.S. and the Jana Sangh that had used bulldozers against
Muslims near Jamma Masjid, but the government. It was not the Jana Sangh and
the R.S.S. that had arrested Muslim opponents of the government and banned the
Jamaat-I-Islam, it was the government. Finally he went on to say it was not
the Jana Sangh and the R.S.S. that had arrested him, but the government.
Freedom for the Muslims, he concluded, depended not upon the election of a
pro-Muslim government, but on living in a country in which the laws protected
all communities.
March 14
Not many Congressmen defected from the Congress party in Andhra. While
there had always been conflicts among the various factions within the Congress
party there, there seemed to be little of the open party warfare that one
heard about in northern India. One of the few people I met who had been with
the Congress party but was now with the opposition was a member of the faculty
at Osmania University. He complained that the government had suspended local
and district elections for the Panchayat Samithis and Zilla Parishads, and the
municipal corporations. Special officers had been appointed to take charge of
all local governments in Andhra. The result, he said, was that officials had
become all-powerful throughout the state. The land reform legislation, he
explained, had not helped the landless but had simply enriched the members of
the revenue department. If you want to get anything done, he said, now you
must deal only with the government officials. "We would rather deal with
corrupt politicians than with corrupt officials. A politician must be concerned
with my feelings since he wants my votes but the bureaucrat knows that eventually
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he will be transferred to another district. Besides, the official always
has his pension! Once the politicians in this state used to have influence
here because of their feudal authority, but because of elections their power
came to rest upon the services they provide to local people. But since the
politicians no longer have any influence, we must now deal directly with
corrupt officials."
"Under the emergency," he continued, "the Congress party has broken down.
There have been no elections to party posts in years. Everything is done by
nominations. Even the chief minister was appointed by New Delhi. Now some
unknown person has been chosen as president of the Andhra Pradesh Congress
Committee. We are supposed to follow him. One day we were told that a new
man was appointed. We didn't know him at all. A lot of Congress politicians
here feel that they would be holding posts in the party or in the government
if there had been elections. Ambitions have been frustrated because there
has been no intra-party democracy."
I asked a high government official in the Andhra state government how
true these charges were. He agreed that the suspension of local governments
had weakened the rural base of the Congress party in the state, that there
was a great deal of resentment in the Congress party against the chief
minister, particularly on the part of the members of the Reddi caste, most of
whom were supporters of Brahmananda Reddi, the home minister in Mrs. Gandhi's
cabinet.
Reddi was widely regarded as a potential defector. It was thought that
he might defect, not because of any principled objection to the emergency but
because he had been humiliated by Mrs. Gandhi's appointment of Om Mehta as
deputy in the home ministry. A favorite strategy of Mrs. Gandhi was to appoint
one of her closest supporters as the deputy to a member of the cabinet. In
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this way she could maintain effective control over the home and finance
ministries, whose ministers were not thought of as totally loyal to Mrs. Gandhi.
Ironically these two ministers were among the few ministers in the central
government who were not defeated in the elections. Some observers attributed
this to the fact that their deputies and not they were largely held responsible
for the excesses committed by the two ministries.
Nonetheless, the Andhra official went on to say, he thought that land-
lords on Andhra had been successful in preventing the government from carrying
out land reform legislation, largely because of their influence with the local
bureaucracy. Some of them, he said, might oppose the Congress party, but he
thought that the Harijan landless laborers would continue to support the
Congress. Though he agreed that the Iman had some influence among lower class
Muslims in Andhra, especially in Hyderabad, he thought that most of the Harijans
and Muslims would remain with the government.
"I expect the Congress party to do well in Andhra, and maybe throughout
the south. I read in the papers that northern India is upset about the family
planning issue but that's not a big issue here. The excesses they talk about
in the north have not been so much of a problem in the south. The officials
have behaved well. There have not been as many arrests as in the north. The
countryside has not been disrupted. And in Andhra and Karnataka the Congress
party is reasonably well organized and not too badly divided as compared with
places like U.P. and Bihar."
Whatever the election outcome, he went on to say, he thought there would
be an economic crisis next year. After three good monsoons, he said, the
fourth year is usually a bad one. "We have a good food surplus now, about
twenty million tons, but we will probably have to draw it down rapidly if we
have a bad monsoon next year. Food prices are likely then to be on the upswing
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and the recession may deepen, particularly since people will not be able to
afford to buy consumer goods." Like many observers who wondered why Mrs. Gandhi
had called the elections now rather than wait until next year, he concluded
that she was advised by her economists that the economy would not be doing as
well next year as now.
"Of course," he went on to say, "one should not dismiss the possibility
that she had been guided by an astrologer in setting the date. You may laugh,"
he continued, "but astrologers have a strong hold on all of us, even those
like myself who are educated and like to think that we are scientific and with-
out superstition. You know I would never call an astrologer to help me make a
decision when I have already made up my mind. If my son, for example, had
already decided who to marry I wouldn't call an astrologer to match his and
the girl's horoscopes. But then I might call an astrologer to fix the date
for the wedding! If I had to make a business trip to Delhi tomorrow I wouldn't
ask the astrologer for approval, but then if I were planning a vacation I
might ask him what is an auspicious date to start travelling. So if we are
uncertain about when to do something we call in an astrologer."
"There is an astrologer here in Hyderabad who regularly flies to Delhi to
consult with Mrs. Gandhi. At least that's what he tells me and I have no
reason to believe that he's not telling the truth. There are also quite a few
prominent people here who consult him. There are some people around Mrs. Gandhi
who call him to Delhi and pay his travel and expenses. Mrs. Gandhi says that
she never calls for astrologers but sometimes they come in to see her, and of
course that is literally quite true. I understand the astrologer told her that
there would be three generations of Nehrus in power. But he didn't say whether
she should start counting from Motilal, her grandfather, or Jawaharlal. It
depends upon whether you're counting presidents of the Congress party or Prime
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Ministers of India! Astrologers are often ambiguous like that, though some-
times they can be firm about something about which you are uncertain. So
maybe the date for calling the election was one of those uncertain decisions
for Mrs. Gandhi."
Madras, March 15
The largest of the crowds that I have seen was at a political rally this
evening at the Marina Beach in Madras. Madras has one of the most attractive
shorelines of any large city in the world. Marina Beach extends almost the
whole length of the city along the Indian Ocean. The large crowds that appear
at election rallies here seem to reflect a long-standing local custom as much
as an expression of political sentiment. After a warm day thousands of Tamils
regularly relax on the beach. They come there in the evening to enjoy the
cool breezes and to take advantage of this large open expanse that is one of
the city's most attractive features. Small stands sell peanuts, cigarettes and
other sundries. Before the emergency local political leaders would address
crowds on the beach every few weeks. Those public meetings were at once a
form of political education, public entertainment (since some of the local
political leaders were film stars), a social gathering of friends, and an
opportunity to relax on the beach after a day's work. During the emergency,
however, public meetings for political purposes were prohibited by the govern-
ment. Now that the prohibition on meetings is lifted there seem to be political
rallies on the beach almost every night.
I am told that nearly half a million people came to hear Mrs. Gandhi
speak here a few days ago. This evening's crowd, which may have been as large
as the one that came to hear Mrs. Gandhi, listened to speeches by Janata party
leaders, and by Mr. Karunananidhi, former chief minister of the state, and
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leader of a pro-Tamil anti-northern regional party known as the D.M.K. The
D.M.K. had governed the state of Tamil Nadu for about a decade and in the
1971 elections had been allied with Mrs. Gandhi and the Congress party. The
local Congress party, however, was unhappy with the alliance between the D.M.K.
and Mrs. Gandhi and as a result the coalition soon fell apart. During the
emergency, the D.M.K. opposed the central government and Tamil Nadu became a
center for underground activities. Many of the underground newspapers, mostly
mimeographed sheets that were circulated throughout India during the elections,
originated from somewhere in Tamil Nadu. Moreover, the D.M.K. had been
unwilling to arrest opponents of Mrs. Gandhi. It came as no surprise, therefore,
when early last year the central government suspended the D.M.K. government
and placed the state under its direct control.
When the elections were called, the D.M.K. formed an alliance with the
Janata party. It seemed like a logical coalition of groups that shared a
common hostility to Mrs. Gandhi and to the Congress party. But the local Janata
party consists largely of people who had split from the Congress in 1969 and
had a long tradition of rivalry with the D.M.K. Moreover, there is some feeling
here that the D.M.K. government was quite unpopular, in spite of its opposition
to Mrs. Gandhi's emergency. The D.M.K. leadership was widely regarded as
corrupt, and the government hopelessly inefficient. In fact the D.M.K. itself
had split in two. A splinter group led by Mr. M.G. Ramachandran, a popular
film actor who is the idol of women and young movie goers, had formed a new
political party.
Since the D.M.K. and the Janata party were allied, it made sense for
"MGR", as he is popularly called, to ally his group with the Congress party.
Some people thought that if the Congress party won in Tamil Nadu it would be
largely because of the popularity of MGR. In all his films MGR plays the
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part of a virtuous hero, an incorruptible man who does not smoke, drink, or
womanize. Some say that Mrs. Gandhi's political advisors encouraged MGR to
leave the D.M.K. and to form a political party that would be allied with
Congress. One sees posters containing photos of Mrs. Gandhi and MGR, wearing
the dark glasses that are universally regarded as part of the guise of a film
actor. MGR's local party office was crowded with enthusiastic young people.
Calcutta, March 16
The polling had already been completed in Calcutta when my plane arrived
at Dum Dum Airport. The elections were staggered over a four-day period so as
to give state officials time to move from place to place to set up polling
stations. The polling was peaceful throughout the country and contrary to
what happened just a week earlier in Pakistan there were few instances of poll
rigging. There was particular concern about the polling in West Bengal since
it was widely agreed that in the 1971 elections there had been massive rigging
by Congress party workers and local officials to prevent a Communist party
victory.
Even without rigging some observers thought that Congress would win at
least half or more of the seats in the state. The compulsory sterilization
program had not been introduced into West Bengal. The Congress government under
the chief ministership of Siddharta Shanker Ray had survived an attempt by
Sanjay Gandhi to replace the chief minister with someone more pliant to his
influence. Sanjay had also failed to get control of the Youth Congress organi-
zation which remained under the leadership of Priya Das Munshi, a bright, tough,
ambitious young anti-Communist who was himself standing for parliament. The
morning after the polling the press, however, reported ballot stuffing in some
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constituencies and charges that someone had printed duplicate ballots were
authenticated. Some of the Janata organizers feared that the rigging may have
cost them several seats in the city. The election commission provided
considerable reassurance when it announced that there would be a re-polling
in a number of the polling stations the next day.
If there had been any rigging by the Congress party it hardly affected
the outcome of the West Bengal election. A few days later it was reported that
Congress had won only three of the states forty-two seats. The opposition
seats were evenly divided, sixteen to the Janata party and sixteen to their
ally, the Communist party Marxist (CPM), and two to smaller parties. The
pro-Soviet Communist party of India (CPI), which had always had a strong base
in West Bengal, was totally wiped out.
The two Communist parties in India had taken diametrically opposed
positions toward the government and toward the emergency. While the Communist
party Marxist had consistently been in opposition and had denounced the
emergency from the very beginning, the Communist party of India had supported
Mrs. Gandhi ever since the 1969 split. It continued to support Mrs. Gandhi
throughout the emergency. The CPI had tied itself to what it described as
the "progressive" wing of the Congress party. It supported a number of former
Communists who had resigned from the party to join, some would say infiltrate,
the Congress.
The CPI was the only significant non-Congress party that had welcomed
the emergency, the arrest of opposition leaders, the banning of political
organizations, and restrictions on the "capitalist" press. But within a few
months after the emergency it became apparent that the Communists too were
feeling its brunt. Strikes were illegal, the automatic annual bonuses to
workers had been ended, and public meetings of trade unions were prohibited --
all of which angered many of the Communist rank and file.
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The emergence of Sanjay also alarmed the Communists. Sanjay's public
attack against the Communists, his anti-Socialist pro-business attitudes, and
his efforts to build a mass base militant Youth Congress seemed to them to
push the country into a reactionary, if not "fascistic" direction. A few
months before the elections Sanjay succeeded in deposing the left-of-center
chief minister of the state of Orissa, Mrs. Satapathy, who had once been a
member of the Communist party. The CPI then launched a frontal attack against
what it described euphemistically as "extra constitutional forces", and tried
to drive a wedge between Mrs. Gandhi, whom they continued to support, and
Sanjay. Much to their surprise, no doubt, Mrs. Gandhi herself responded with
a series of public speeches accusing the Communists of being anti-national
and reminding the country of the role they played in opposing the nationalist
movement and supporting the British during the Second World War. In a very
personal speech she talked about the way in which the Nehru family would
defend itself, and she attacked those who tried to draw a line between herself
and her son.
When the elections were called the central committee of the Communist
party announced that it would support the Congress, but that it would permit
each of the state communist parties to decide whether to work with the govern-
ment or with the opposition. In West Bengal the CPI supported Congress, but
in Bihar and U.P. it sided with the opposition. The absurdity of the Communist
position was caught by a cartoon in the Hindustan Times showing a man at a
microphone asking a crowd of people, "All those for Congress raise their hands,"
and then, "Those for Janata....". "How is it," he asked a spectacled man, "you
raise one hand for Congress and the other for Janata?" "I'm CPI," came the
reply.
In public meetings opposition candidates laughingly ridiculed the Commu-
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nists by saying that the CPI urged people to "vote for the cow without the
cal f".
March 17
Gore Ghosh, a writer and editor for Ananda Bazar Patrika, a leading
Bengali newspaper, described for me the circumstances of his arrest. He
explained that he was initially arrested under the Defense of India Rules for
"rioting-, bombing, and misbehavior!" His lawyers brought the case to court
where the charges were thrown out. He was then immediately arrested again,
under MISA, the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, an act which permits
the government to make arrests without charges.
One Calcutta lawyer, a one-time Socialist who for the last fifteen years
had not actively taken part in politics, told me that he was now devoting all
his time to supporting the Janata party candidate for parliament in his
constituency. The lawyers in Calcutta, he said, bitterly opposed the consti-
tutional amendments introduced by Mrs. Gandhi and by the efforts of Mrs. Gandhi
to place herself above the law. If Janata wins, he continued, we hope there
will be a commission of inquiry for Sanjay and possibly for Mrs. Gandhi as well.
"Can you imagine," he said, "that lawyers should be marching in public demon-
strations in the streets of Calcutta?" Not only were they angry, he added, at
the government's suspension of civil liberties, and at its efforts to destroy
the independence of the judiciary, but they were also aroused at the government's
efforts to get control of the national bar association. In West Bengal, he
continued, the bar councils are now actively working against the Congress party
in all of the district towns throughout the state.
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March 18
My conversations with businessmen are often on plane trips. This evening
on the plane trip from Calcutta to New Delhi I sat next to an executive who
works for Tata Steel. Like several other executives and businessmen I met he
was quite concerned over the possibilities of a defeat for Mrs. Gandhi and the
Congress party. He thought the discipline that Mrs. Gandhi had created during
the emergency was good for the country and he especially welcomed the ban on
strikes and restrictions on bonuses for workers. He approved of the lower tax
rates on higher incomes, the relaxation of government controls over business
and the new emphasis on export promotion. Like many businessmen he expressed
hope that the Congress party would win, but by a reduced majority so that
some of the excessive features of the emergency might be dropped. The worst
outcome, he said, was a victory for the Janata party because that would mean
unstable government. "How could these people hold together? They may be
united now against Mrs. Gandhi but once they take power the Jana Sangh, the
Socialists, and the former Congressmen like Morarji Desai will never get on.
The Janata people all talk of 'Gandhian socialism' but that's all poetry. What
will they do when they have to decide on tax policies, or export policies, or
priorities in the new budget? Many of the Janata candidates have talked about
ending the compulsory deposit scheme, but if they do, where are they going to
get money for the Five Year Plan? And do you think Vajpayee, who has always
favored developing the nuclear bomb, and Morarji,.who says he is a Gandhian,
will agree on nuclear issues?
"Even if they agree on policies," he continued, "their ambitions will
clash. If Congress loses U.P., then Bahaguna and Charan Singh will fight over
who takes control over the state. And in Orissa there will be Biju Patnaik
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against Satapathy. In every state in northern India there will be clashes.
Without a strong Prime Minister there cannot be peace in the states. If the
states fall apart how long can the center hold? We will be right back to
where we started from a few years ago."
New Delhi, March 19
New Delhi was tense on the eve of the counting of the ballots. Today
was the last day of balloting throughout the country. Tomorrow morning
government officers will open the ballot boxes and start counting. Rumors
have spread around the city that Mrs. Gandhi might provoke violence at the
counting stations and then use the violence as a pretext for calling in the
border security forces or the army to "restore order'. Mrs. Gandhi made a
statement a few days ago that was by no means reassuring. She accused the
opposition of fomenting violence and hatred and said that the press was
adopting anti-national positions, language that was strikingly similar to
language she had used before she declared the emergency twenty months ago.
Mr. Advani, the able general secretary of the Janata party, issued a reply in
which he said that the Election Commissioner had only a few days earlier commended
all of the political parties for the exemplary fashion in which they had con-
ducted themselves during the election campaign. Janata leaders made a special
point of urging their followers to exercise restraint, and to avoid any provoca-
tive processions against the Congress party, especially at the counting station.
The report a few days ago that some miscreants had shot at Sanjay Gandhi
while he was travelling in his jeep in Amrethi constituency was greeted with
derision by Janata leaders who said that this was an attempt by Sanjay to win
sympathy. A few Janata leaders expressed their anxiety that Mrs. Gandhi might
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use such incidents for taking steps to crack down on the opposition.
I heard an unverified rumor that Mrs. Gandhi had asked the military to
go on the alert in the event that there might be disturbances when the ballots
were counted, but that the military had told her that they did not think that
it was necessary.
This evening another rumor spread around the city that an unusually large
number of police had been seen moving toward one of the counting stations in
the southern part of New Delhi. Several journalists on the staff of the
Indian Express rushed to the counting station only to find a number of young
Janata party poll watchers unpacking their bedrolls from their motorcycles,
planning to spend the long night at the polling station watching over the
sealed ballot boxes until the counting begins the next morning.
A journalist friend, who was confident that Mrs. Gandhi would lose the
election, said that it was not certain that the government would not launch a
strike against the opposition. After all, he said, they had all been caught
unaware by Mrs. Gandhi's declaration of an emergency and political arrests,
and it was not impossible that her closest advisors were even now urging her to
take some drastic measures in order to avoid an electoral defeat.
March 20
This city has been in a state of expectation all day. The government-run
Press Information Bureau and several of the newspapers have placed large bill-
boards around the city, where they can list the returns of each party by state
as they come in, in the evening. Though no returns are expected until after
five o'clock in the evening, crowds of people had begun to assemble early in
the afternoon around the large billboards.
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The Election Commission does not announce the results in any parliamentary
constituency until all the ballots in that constituency are counted. However,
since each of the party candidates have their own poll watchers inside the
counting stations, word is sent out during the day to report who is leading.
By early evening, therefore, party workers and journalists were already
receiving initial returns, but none of the results were broadcast on the
government-run All India Radio, or posted on the Press Information Bureau or
newspaper billboards until later in the evening. By seven in the evening, it
was apparent that the Janata party was winning all of the seats in northern
India, while the Congress party was winning in the south. The earliest returns
posted on the billboards and announced on the radio were from the south where
the Congress had won, but the crowds in New Delhi had already received word of
the Janata victory elsewhere in India. Even while the billboards reported
Congress leads the crowds were already cheering the Janata victories. As the
Janata victories were posted on the billboards later at night, the enthusiasm
of the crowds grew and shouts went up with the posting of each Janata victory.
The enthusiasm was particularly great when the returns came in from the Delhi
constituencies. The Janata party had swept all seven seats in the city.
March 21
This morning's newspapers announced the defeat of Indira Gandhi in Rai
Bareli constituency in U.P. Mrs. Gandhi lost with 122,000 votes against her
opponent, Raj Narain, who won with 177,000 votes. It was a particularly sweet
victory for Mr. Narain, a Socialist member of the Janata party, who had been
among the first arrested by Mrs. Gandhi on the evening of June 25, 1975 when
she declared the emergency. After his overwhelming defeat by Mrs. Gandhi in
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the 1971 parliamentary elections, Raj Narain accused her of violating the
election law. Most educated Indians were convinced that it was the decision
of the Allahabad High Court in early June that Mrs. Gandhi had broken the law
and should step down as a member of parliament (and therefore as Prime Minister)
that led her to declare the emergency, arrest the opposition, and impose press
censorship.
In the nearby constituency of Amethi, Sanjay Gandhi was defeated. His
opponent won 176,000 votes against Sanjay's vote of 100,000 in a constituency
that had previously overwhelmingly elected a Congress candidate.
Although all returns are not yet in, it is apparent that the Janata
party and its ally, the Congress for Democracy, have won an overwhelming victory
against the Congress party. Reports have been coming in all day long about the
defeat of prominent Congress leaders, including members of the cabinet, and
the victory of prominent Janata leaders. Bansi Lal was defeated. So was
V.C. Shukla, the Minister of Information, as well as Mr. Gokhale, the Law
Minister. Virtually all of the leaders of the Janata party and the Congress
for Democracy were elected, often with staggeringly large margins of victory.
George Fernandez, the Socialist trade unionist, won his seat with a margin of
over 300,000 votes, although (some say because) he was in jail during the
entire election campaign and was unable to visit his constituency.
As I drove around the city in taxis and motor rickshaws the drivers would
slow down or stop at each of the billboards to see the latest count and to see
who had been elected or defeated. My rickshaw driver laughed when he read the
flash announcement on the billboard in front of the Hindustan Times which said
"Sanjay quits politics". Why are you laughing, I asked him, and he replied in
English, "We threw Sanjay out and now he says he is quitting!"
Abu, the popular cartoonist for the Indian Express, did a cartoon this
-41-
morning showing two men listening to All India Radio. "V.C. Shukla has lost?
Is the news reliable?"
All day long various political leaders have been issuing statements
explaining the meaning of the election results and giving their own interpre-
tations of why the voters turned the Congress party out. Atal Behari Vajpayee,
the Janata party leader, who a few days later was to be appointed India's
Minister of External Affairs, greeted his own victory with a statement that
the election had been "more like a referendum than an ordinary election." The
people in his opinion had voted, he said, against "coercion, regimentation,
and intimidation ... They voted for freedom, cooperation, and for an open
system and society." The Iman of Jamma Masjid, attributed the victory of the
Janata party to the unity of Hindus and Muslims, adding that "it is not the
Congress that has been defeated but oppression." When newsmen asked Morarji
Desai whether he considered this his finest hour, he graciously said, "This
is the country's finest hour. Everything that Gandhiji stood for has been
vindicated."
Asked to explain the factors behind his own remarkable win against Mrs.
Gandhi, Raj Narain said that one was the arrest of leaders like Jayaprakash
Narayan and Morarji Desai, while another was the government's mistaken notion
that family planning and forced sterilization were the same thing.
Mr. N.A. Palkhiwala, a noted constitutional lawyer who had spoken out
frequently against the proposed amendments to the constitution, said that
"history will record that the true gains of the emergency have been the unifica-
tion of the opposition, the sharp awakening of the political conscience of the
nation, and the dawn of realization among the people that they are the only
keepers of the constitution."
Jayaprakash Narayan said that "The people have made their choice. They
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have opted for liberty. I trust they will not ever relent their vigil."
Tendering her resignation, Mrs. Gandhi said "The collective judgement of
the people must be respected. My colleagues and I accept their verdict
unreservedly and in a spirit of humility." Sanjay, announcing that he was
quitting active politics, said that "I am all the more sorry if what I did in
my personal capacity has recoiled on my mother whose life has been spent in
selfless service."
The president of the Congress party in Delhi said that "demolitions,
unimaginative enforcement of pricetagging order, and up to a small extent the
family planning drive" were the main factors for the defeat of the Congress
party in Delhi. The National Herald, the Allahabad newspaper closely tied to
the Nehru family and to Mrs. Gandhi, attributed the defeat of the Congress
party to "vilification and misrepresentation."
In a remarkable turnaround most of the other newspapers that had supported
Mrs. Gandhi now heralded the victory of the Janata party as a victory for
democracy. In a long article, the editor of the Times of India, who had
cautiously supported Mrs. Gandhi during the emergency, wrote about the destruc-
tion of democracy and human rights during the emergency and welcomed the return
to democratic government.
Within the government most of the officials welcomed the defeat of Mrs.
Gandhi, and especially the removal from power of Sanjay Gandhi and his closest
associates.
But I heard another point of view, a minority perhaps, that is worthy of
being recorded. A senior government official who had spent his career in
relatively non-political ministries, expressed his alarm at Mrs. Gandhi's
defeat. "Sometimes I think we are a suicidal people. Whenever we are close to
doing something successful, we pull back. There are rare moments in our history
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when we came close to having a leadership capable of pulling the country
together. There was Ashoka and Chandragupta, and Akbar, and Curzon. They each
had their own ways of doing things. So did Mrs. Gandhi. Now that she is over-
thrown, just when we had a chance of uniting the country, we will be replacing
her with satraps, regional leaders who will pull in different directions without
a central national leader. The south is not with this government and each of
these Janata leaders will start to build their own centers of power in the
states. These people talk about decentralizing power but that's only another
way of talking about giving power to themselves."
March 22
The full returns are now in. The Janata party and the Congress for
Democracy won 298 seats, and with their allies won a total of 328 seats out of
542. Congress won 153 seats in parliament. The Janata party alone won 271
seats or just half of the seats in parliament.
The proportion of the Congress party vote declined from 44% in 1971 to
34.5% in 1977. The Janata party won 43%. In 1971 the constituents of the
Janata party together won 25% of the vote.
The most striking feature of the results was the regional schism. 221 of
the Janata and Congress for Democracy seats were won in the predominantly Hindi-
speaking region in the north, while the Congress party won only two seats in
the same region. This was an extraordinary blow for the Congress. The Hindi
region had been the heartland of the nationalist movement and of the Congress
party since independence, and the area from which all three of India's Prime
Ministers had come.
The two western states, Maharashtra and Gujarat, were more evenly split,
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with 35 seats for the Janata party, and 32 for Congress. In the northeastern
region 35 seats went to Janata, 23 to Congress and 16 to the pro-Janata
Communist party Marxist.
The voting in south India was markedly different than in the rest of the
country. In the four southern states the Congress party won 92 out of 129 seats,
as against only six for Janata.
In other words, 75% of all the seats won by the Janata party and the
Congress for Democracy were from the seven northern Hindi-speaking states and
the capital city. Of all the seats won by the Congress party, 60% were from
the four states of south India. In Tamil Nadu the regional party led by
M.G. Ramachandran, the Tamil film star, actually won the largest number of
seats in the state, 19 out of 39. And in Kerala, the Congress victory was
part of a larger victory sweep for a united front coalition which included the
Congress, the pro-Soviet Communists, and the Muslim league, a coalition which
had successfully governed the state during the past six years. But whatever
local factors appeared to be at work in Tamil Nadu and Kerala, it was evident
that the Janata wave had not swept south of the Vindhya mountains, nor, some
argued, did the worst excesses of the emergency.
The north-south schism led some observers to question whether Indians
had voted in favor of democracy or whether north Indians had simply turned
against a government that had adopted some unpopular policies. Many Congress
supporters argued that Mrs. Gandhi's mistake was to adopt so many unpopular
measures just before the elections. An aggressive sterilization program, they
argued, was a fine idea in a country where the population is increasing as some
fifteen million a year and where some aggressive measures are needed if the
country is to bring down the birth rate at a faster pace. Perhaps, they say,
a few excesses were committed but no other program had worked so far. Moving
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the slum dwellers out of Delhi, Congress supporters maintained, was also
desirable, though perhaps in their zeal government officers moved too hastily.
The bonuses for employees had to be ended since there was no economic justifi-
cation for a bonus system that was completely independent of productivity or
profits. The compulsory deposit scheme under which a portion of the annual
increments of workers had to be put into compulsory savings certificates was
necessary if the government was to restrain inflation. But each of those
programs alienated an important constituency, Mrs. Gandhi's supporters said.
Sterilization and slum clearance affected the lowest classes, particularly
Harijans and Muslims. The attack against the bonus scheme alienated the
industrial labor force. The compulsory deposit scheme antagonized the middle
class. And some of the equity policies alienated the richer classes. Land-
lords resented the government's decision to abolish rural debt. Shopkeepers
didn't like the government's system of requiring fixed prices marked on all
items for sale. Government officers who were fired for their inefficiency
were resentful. In short, the people of northern India had voted against the
"discipline" that Mrs. Gandhi had introduced. Northern Indians, it was claimed,
had voted against these unpopular measures, not against the emergency itself.
The people had not voted against the suspension of habeas corpus, or restrictions
on freedom of the press, or limitations on the powers of the judiciary. After
all, south Indians had no more freedoms than the north but since some of these
programs, especially the sterilization campaign and the slum clearance program,
were not adopted in the south the people there had no "excesses" to vote
against.
Janata party supporters counter these arguments by saying that the south
has simply not experienced the full losses of liberty that had taken place in
the north, and that the sterilization campaign and slum clearance programs were
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just two examples of an arbitrary government at work. The two programs were
indicative of what can happen when there is an arbitrary government and none
of the checks and balances that a democracy provides.
Arbitrary government, they said, also produced arbitrary men. Many a
rural community as well as urban neighborhood had its little Sanjays --
politicians, government officials, landlords, and local toughs, usually members
of Sanjay's Youth Congress, who used their connections to push people around.
If these people were more common in the north than in the south it was because
Sanjay's influence was far more pervasive in the northern states. He and his
three closest allies, Bansi Lal, Om Mehta, and V.C. Shukla -- some Indians
called then the "gang of four" -- had created an atmosphere of arbitrary govern-
ment throughout the north. Even if the reports of compulsory sterilization
and police excesses were exaggerated, an atmosphere of fear had spread
throughout the north that had not affected south India. In any event, the
Janata wave had not left the south unaffected. In Andhra, the Janata party
vote increased from 12% in 1971 to 32% in 1977, and in Karnataka where Congress
had won 71% of the votes in 1971, they now won only 57%, while the share of the
Janata vote jumped from 24% to 40%.
While the north-south division was unexpected, even more unexpected to
some observers including one suspects by Mrs. Gandhi herself, was the absence
of a division between rural and urban India. In those parts of the country
where the Janata party won, they did equally well in either urban or rural
constituencies. All seven seats in Delhi went to Janata candidates, but so did
all the surrounding rural constituencies in the Punjab, Haryana, and nearby
Uttar Pradesh. Janata also won the urban constituencies of Banares, Lucknow,
Allahabad, Agra, Meerut and Kanpur, all in Uttar Pradesh where Janata swept all
of the 85 seats. Similarly, the Janata party and its allies won all of the
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urban seats in and around Calcutta, and they also won all but three seats in
the state of West Bengal.
In south India the Congress party did nearly as well in the urban
constituencies as it did in the rural areas. In Tamil Nadu, for example,
Congress and its allies won two out of the three seats in the city of Madras,
and carried the urban constituencies of industrial Coimbatore and Madurai. In
Andhra, where Congress won 41 out of the 42 seats, Congress carried both of
the urban seats in the city of Hyderabad. Congress, though with a reduced
margin of votes, swept the state of Karnataka, losing only one of the. two
urban seats in the city of Bangalore. Only in the state of Maharashtra in
western India was there a substantial difference between urban and rural
constituencies. The Janata party and its allies swept all six seats in Bombay,
but won only half of the constituencies in the entire state. In most of the
country the elections demonstrated that urban and rural areas in India tend to
be affected by much the same influences.
Mrs. Gandhi's hope that she might at least win the support of the poorest
classes in rural and urban India proved to be false. The margin of victory
for Janata party candidates in many of the north Indian constituencies with
large scheduled caste populations was often quite overwhelming. The north
Indian constituencies that elected Harijans to parliament voted overwhelmingly
for Janata, in one case, in a Bihar constituency, by a margin of 89% against
8% for Congress. In general the margins were 70% for Janata, 20 or 25% for
Congress. Similarly, many of the constituencies in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh., and
West Bengal with large Muslim populations voted solidly for Janata party candi-
dates. The Congress party also lost the predominantly tribal constituencies
in Orissa, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh. Mrs. Gandhi's efforts to persuade India's
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minorities and lowest castes that their security and prosperity depended on
the continuation of the Congress party in power had failed. The historic
links between those communities and the Congress party came to an end, However,
the Congress party and its allies continued to do well in the Muslim constitu-
encies of Kashmir, Assam, and in the south.
60.4% of India's electorate voted. This was well above the 55.3% who
took part in the 1971 parliamentary elections which swept Mrs. Gandhi back into
power. The increase in voter turnout was particularly great in those states
which had been hit hard by the government's sterilization program -- Bihar,
Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, and the Punjab. In Haryana and the
Punjab, the two states surrounding the capital city, resentment against the
sterilization program was reportedly particularly intense. 73% of the voters
there turned out -- about 13% more than in the previous election. Three states
which did not experience the "excesses" of the sterilization program but none-
theless gave the Janata party and its allies an overwhelming majority, experi-
enced little or no increases in turnout -- West Bengal, Orissa, and Rajasthan.
There was just a small increase in voter turnout in Maharashtra, but a whopping
increase, from 53 to 69%, in the northwestern state of Gujarat, the center of
the Janata agitation prior to the declaration of an emergency. Voter turnout
also increased substantially in two southern states which elected Congress
candidates but with substantially reduced margins and there was actually a
decline in the vote in Tamil Nadu. The election returns generally confirmed
the widespread impression that the emergency, rather than reducing the politici-
zation of the country, actually increased it. People who had never taken part
in elections before came out to vote, mostly against the government though in
some places even for the government.
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March 23
The leadership of the Janata party and the Congress for Democracy is
expected to meet tomorrow to choose India's new Prime Minister. Tomorrow
morning the members of Parliament from both groups will meet at Rajghat, the
memorial to Mahatma Gandhi, to take an oath of service to the country. Later
in the day Jayaprakash is expected to meet with Morarji Desai and Jagjivan Ram,
two contenders. Representatives of the third candidate, Charan Singh, who is
currently ill, are also expected to take part in the discussion.
Morarji Desai is in his eighties, Charan Singh is in his seventies, and
Jagjivan Ram is sixty-eight. All three are former Congressmen, all are
experienced government officials, and all three are reassuring figures to the
bureaucracy, business community, and to the country as a whole.
It is generally expected that Morarji will be chosen, since he is the
senior most leader of the Janata party who "deserves" the position because of
his consistent opposition for nearly a decade to Mrs. Gandhi. There is a sense,
moreover, that these three men also represent the last of the nationalist
generation. Those in the next tier of leadership in the Janata party are all
in their forties or fifties. Among those who have emerged as national figures
during the emergency and the elections are: George Fernandez, the trade union
leader who escaped into the underground until his arrest a few months ago by
the government on charges that he was fomenting an armed attack; Subramanian
Swami, the Harvard-M.I.T. trained economist who sneaked in and out of India
during the emergency under the eyes of a benign police establishment that had
been reportedly infiltrated by his own fellow party men in the Jana Sangh;
Chandra Sekhar, perhaps the most popular and charismatic figure of the socialist
young Turks who had been in the Congress party until he and other of his
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supporters were arrested by Mrs. Gandhi, and whom some regard as a potential
Prime Minister; Mohan Dharia, another Turk in the Congress party who resigned
from Mrs. Gandhi's cabinet shortly before the emergency and who, like Chandra
Sekhar, is widely regarded as a man of great principle; Atul Bihari Vajpayee,
one of the able Jana Sangh leaders who is respected as a spokesman for the new
more secular nationalist Jana Sangh; and L.K. Advani, another young Jana Sangh
leader who served as the secretary of the Janata party, carefully minding the
central office of the party while its national leaders were on tour.
Many observers here are concerned that if Jagjivan Ram's Congress for
Democracy does not merge with the Janata party there might, in the near future,
be conflict between the two parties, especially if the Congress party begins to
fall apart. Although the electorate produced a two-party system (or, more
accurately, a two-and-a-half party system), the fragility of the Congress party
and the independent status of the Congress for Democracy makes the party
structure very unstable. Chandra Sekhar, describing the party system as very
fluid, said that "the situation in the states and in the central government
may look very different a year from now."
Today, even before a new government has been chosen, the government
announced that the proclamation of emergency issued on June 25, 1975 has been
revoked. The ban on twenty-six organizations, including the R.S.S. and Jamaat-
I-Islamia has been lifted. The central government has advised the state
governments to release all political detenues. The government has also issued
an order ending press censorship and has withdrawn the circulars asking govern-
ment departments, public sector undertakings, and other government bodies not
to advertise in the Statesman and the Indian Express. The Janata party secretary,
Mr. L.K. Advani, announced that among the first acts of the new government will
be the repeal of the Press Objectionable Matter Act, a review of the Maintenance
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of Internal Security Act, and rescinding of the 42nd Amendment to the Constitu-
tion.
Abu, in his cartoon in this morning's Indian Express, portrayed an
elderly villager squatting on the ground smoking his hookah (a traditional
water pipe), and asking Jayaprakash Narayan, "Has my revolution been as total
as you wished it to be?"
At the large billboard on Parliament Street when the election returns
were still coming in, I asked a group of people who they thought would be India's
next Prime Minister. Did they prefer Morarji Desai, Jagjivan Ram, or Charan
Singh? "It doesn't matter," said one of the men. "If we don't like the Prime
Minister we can always replace him."
Myron Weiner
